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Abstract
Modern software systems heavily use C/C++ based libraries.
Because of the weak memory model of C/C++, libraries may
suffer from vulnerabilities which can expose the applications
to potential attacks. For example, a very large number of
return oriented programming gadgets exist in glibc that allow
stitching together semantically valid but malicious Turing-
complete programs. In spite of significant advances in attack
detection and mitigation, full defense is unrealistic against an
ever-growing set of possibilities for generating such malicious
programs.
In this work, we create a defense mechanism by debloating
libraries to reduce the dynamic functions linked so that the
possibilities of constructing malicious programs diminishes
significantly. The key idea is to locate each library call site
within an application, and in each case to load only the set
of library functions that will be used at that call site. This
approach of demand-driven loading relies on an input-aware
oracle that predicts a near-exact set of library functions needed
at a given call site during the execution. The predicted func-
tions are loaded just in time, and the complete call chain (of
function bodies) inside the library is purged after returning
from the library call back into the application. We present
a decision-tree based predictor, which acts as an oracle, and
an optimized runtime system, which works directly with li-
brary binaries like GNU libc and libstdc++. We show that
on average, the proposed scheme cuts the exposed code sur-
face of libraries by 97.2%, reduces ROP gadgets present in
linked libraries by 97.9%, achieves a prediction accuracy in
most cases of at least 97%, and adds a small runtime over-
head of 18% on all libraries (16% for glibc, 2% for others)
across all benchmarks of SPEC 2006, suggesting this scheme
is practical.
1 Introduction
Modern software relies heavily on libraries that are often built
for supporting a large amount of functionality. In a given
application, however, only a small of amount of such func-
tionality may get used. For example, programmers leverage
Android libraries, lean on machine learning and AI tools,
and build on top of web frameworks to improve productiv-
ity [3, 9, 19, 42, 53]. Although these frameworks can be daunt-
ingly large, it is normal to use only a small subset of the
APIs and in fact a small subset of their functionality. A recent
study [46] shows that only about 10% of the shared library
functions in userspace programs that ship with Ubuntu Desk-
top 16.04 are used. For performance reasons, these underlying
libraries are inevitably written in C/C++. The memory model
offered by C/C++ suffers from many weaknesses and leads
to a large number of exploits that expose the applications or
frameworks that use the libraries, in turn leaving them vulner-
able. One such library that forms the core of C/C++ libraries
and applications is the GNU version of libc, or “glibc” [23].
Glibc also acts as a basic building block of other libraries and
their higher-level APIs in GNU/Linux systems. Unfortunately,
the list of vulnerabilities and exploits in glibc keeps growing,
with 99 known and published vulnerabilities at the time of
this writing [13], of which nine were published in 2018.
Over the years, several hardware and software defense
mechanisms have been developed to detect and mitigate the
attacks; however, such mechanisms have limitations. Some
of the hardening techniques such as address-space layout ran-
domization [44] (ASLR) and data execution prevention [2]
(DEP) cannot protect against advanced control-flow hijack
techniques like return-oriented programming [48] (ROP) and
jump-oriented programming [7] (JOP). To defend against
the exploitation of these advanced vulnerabilities, specific
and general mechanisms have been invented. One such well-
known defense mechanism that has been researched exten-
sively is control-flow integrity (CFI) [1, 6, 12, 26, 36, 61], a
mechanism that attempts to restrict the program execution to
legal paths only.
While coarse-grained CFI such as bin-CFI (a binary-level
CFI technique) [63] restricts jumps to ROP and JOP gadgets
at addresses other than that of functions, it over-approximates
the legal execution paths possible through calls and returns.
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This allows for malicious program paths and thus overlooks
certain attacks. To reduce the approximation of the allowed
set of calls from a call site and to maintain legal returns, a
number of fine-grained CFI techniques such as piCFI [41]
and MCFI [40] leverage the source code of libraries. How-
ever, computing a fully-precise CFI is an intractable problem
because of the inherent limitations in pointer analysis [18], ir-
regular control flow in the presence of setjmp and longjmp, or
an inherent inability to distinguish between a legal and illegal
dynamic control flow base with regard to the current program
input. µCFI leverages Intel Processor Trace and static analysis
to enforce its unique target code property [26] for indirect
control-flow transfers. It differs from our proposed solution in
several ways, including: it relies on Intel PT (which currently
requires kernel support); it handles application code and not
libraries; it requires source; and it is limited against certain
classes of attacks (as we will show below in a code example).
Control-Flow Bending [10] (CFB) showed that even a fully-
precise static CFI cannot defend against many non-control
data attacks. CFB demonstrated that with the availability of
a dispatcher function, commonly available in glibc, a CFI
mechanism can be fooled to successfully carry out an attack.
CFI also does not handle non-control data attacks such as cer-
tain types of privilege escalation [11, 64]. Unlike CFI, which
allows memory corruption but prevents exploits, another class
of defense mechanism that prevents memory corruption is
memory safety that requires checks to verify the correctness
of memory operations. While memory safety techniques can
thwart almost all control-flow hijack attacks they incur over-
heads ≥ 2x [38]. Because CFI in general does not completely
defend against all the control-hijack attacks for which it is
built, it should be complemented with defense mechanisms
for specific attacks. Moreover, as defenses strengthen, new
attacks are revealed that undermine the current best practices
of defense mechanisms. Due to the sophistication of attack
construction tools, the number of newly discovered attacks
are growing at a much faster rate, which might lead to a losing
battle [54].
To reduce the effects of such unseen attacks, a promising
way forward is program debloating [31], that is, downsizing
the amount of code available for constructing an attack gadget.
One of the established ways of accomplishing this is software
debloating, in which unwanted or dead code is removed from
the application or library. Current compiler-based link-time
optimizations statically determine a set of functions to be
removed from the linked library using a combined analysis
of unreachable functions, global constant propagation, and
interprocedural evaluation of branch outcomes using the fixed
points of unreachable code and (conditionally propagated)
constants [15,29,51,52]. Piece-wise compilation [46] collects
address-taken functions of each module and loads only those
functions that are required by the program. However, many
functions are still stitched to the program, so it still relies on
a CFI mechanism for defense. Such approaches retain a con-
servative over-approximation of the set of functions that are
linked and needed by the program as a whole. That is, at dif-
ferent program points, multiple functions of the library could
be reachable/needed, so they are left linked; This significantly
increases the code surface (of dynamically linked functions).
ROP and JOP gadgets across call sites are still available for
exploitation in the code that is linked to the application.
Software debloating at call sites that use function pointers
faces the same limitation of over-approximation seen in CFI,
allowing construction of such gadgets. Although static pro-
gram debloating is a right step towards thwarting unknown
possibilities of attacks, it is quite ineffective due to the limita-
tions of static analyzability of programs, because of which a
lot of code still remains linked. A major limitation of the static
debloaters is that the attacker can replay the execution of a
statically debloated code over and over under the guidance
of a debugger to systematically construct a Turing-complete
attack gadget. Also, most of the state-of-the-art defense tech-
niques in CFI, memory safety, and software debloating require
source code analysis, thus leaving out libraries such as glibc
that are notorious for extremely complex control flow which
poses a huge obstacle for inter-procedural analysis of reason-
able sophistication (static or dynamic) .
In response to the limitations mentioned above, we pro-
pose BlankIt, a a defense mechanism based on binaries of
the libraries that significantly reduces dynamically linked
functions, adds protection against ROP and JOP attacks, and
overcomes the limitations of false negative approximation in
CFI and significantly diminishes attackers’ ability to carry
out replay to devise a new attack gadget. BlankIt relies on the
following core ideas:
• Only load a set of needed/predicted functions from the
library at a call site on demand at runtime. The predictor
acts as an input-based oracle and provides a list of such
functions required. These functions are loaded in a pro-
tected read-only area. The other functions in the library
are blanked out either by writing zeros or the semantic
equivalent of a NOP.
• The execution of the loaded library functions continues
under the supervision of probes, which fire before each
function’s invocation; if more functions are needed for
execution, they are loaded on demand under the guidance
of an audit and alarm phase.
• When the library execution returns to the call site, the
complete call chain of loaded functions is purged or
blanked out.
• On misprediction, a simultaneously running process re-
ceives the arguments to the library function to run with
full memory safety and check for violations.
The above scheme significantly diminishes an attacker’s abil-
ity to create a gadget that transcends the set of functions
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loaded at a call site. For example, if the attacker attempts to
jump to a location of any ROP or JOP gadget that is inside
a function which is not loaded, the control flow will go to
a blanked section (i.e. the instruction pointer will find only
zeros) and crash. Blanking and loading just-in-time disallows
a return instruction to target all possible return addresses, un-
like in bin-CFI [63], which makes BlankIt a stronger binary
control-hijacking defense mechanism. Another binary-level
tool called TypeArmor [56] tries to handle this, but it es-
sentially appends a feature to bin-CFI that reduces only the
over-approximation of forward edges. Also, BlankIt’s zeroing
mechanism does not make any assumptions about the binary
for collecting the legal targets, as in the case of bin-CFI [63].
The success of the blanking scheme depends on predicting
the exact set of functions needed at runtime. Over approxima-
tion expands dynamically linked functions (e.g. leaving more
ROP gadgets intact), whereas under approximation increases
runtime overheads. BlankIt prediction is highly precise, re-
lying on machine learning to determine the input-related dy-
namic execution path in an oracular manner. The learning
technique overcomes the limitations of over-approximation
that exist in the case of fine-grained CFI mechanisms like
piCFI or MCFI. For example, in the general case like that
of Code 1, any fine-grained CFI mechanism or software-
debloating mechanism like piece-wise compilation [46] fails
to see that myFnPtr always calls function foo when argc
is greater than 2 and classifies both foo and bar as valid
jumps from the function pointer call. In contrast, our predic-
tion mechanism, based on profiling several call characteristics,
learns that foo is called by myFnPtr when argc is greater
than 2. Under perfect prediction or oracular behavior (which
we will show is achievable), BlankIt does not allow bar to
be loaded. If mispredictions may occur and are allowed, then
BlankIt will not load bar without entering a audit and alarm
phase that checks for violations. Similarly, handling the valid
set of jumps in the case of setjmp/longjmp is very easy in
BlankIt compared to CFI mechanisms.
Code pointer Integrity (CPI) [28] is a defense mechanism
that uses memory safety only on pointers that can directly or
indirectly modify code pointers (control-flow) thus lowering
the overheads of a full memory safety mechanism but allow-
ing some control-flow bending attacks. For example, in the
non-control data attack from [64] shown in Code 2, the user
is verified by an input password, and the result is assigned to
the variable "user". The user is frequently checked to provide
access to certain operations. However, inbetween the checks,
the function interacts with the user to get some other inputs.
Input "someinput" can be manipulated by the user, causing a
buffer overflow vulnerability in line 12, and leading to super
user access. This attack is not handled by CPI or the latest CFI
(piCFI, µCFI), but in the case of BlankIt, the "call_super_user"
function is not predicted, and the attack is detected in the audit
and mitigation phase that checks for violations (please refer
to section 3.3 for details). However, BlankIt only handles
such attacks when a function call is involved, since that is
the prediction granularity it currently operates on. On top of
flagging such attacks, another advantage is that BlankIt is a
binary defense mechanism and works on glibc, unlike most
of the state-of-the-art defense mechanisms like CPI, piCFI, or
CETS. 1 void foo ( i n t M, i n t N)
2 {
3 . . .
4 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < N; i ++)
5 {
6 A[ i ] = A[ i −1] + A[ i −2];
7 }
8 }
9
10 void b a r ( i n t a , i n t b )
11 {
12 . . .
13 }
14 t ypede f void (∗ pt2Func ) ( i n t , i n t ) ;
15 void main ( i n t argc , char ∗∗ a rgv )
16 {
17 pt2Func ∗myFnPtr = &b a r ;
18 i n t a = 0 , b = 0 ;
19 i f ( a r g c > 2) {
20 myFnPtr = &foo ;
21 a = 1 ; b = 2 ;
22 }
23 myFnPtr ( a , b ) ;
24 }
Code 1: Snippet for considering CFI and BlankIt approaches
1 void Access ( char pwd [ 2 0 ] )
2 {
3 char s t r [ SIZE ] , u s e r [ SIZE ] ;
4 char ∗ some inpu t ;
5
6 v e r i f y _ u s e r ( u se r , pwd ) ;
7 i f ( s t rncmp ( use r , " admin " , 5 ) ) {
8 . . .
9 } e l s e {
10 . . .
11 }
12 s t r c p y ( s t r , some inpu t ) ;
13 i f ( s t rncmp ( use r , " admin " , 5 ) ) {
14 c a l l _ s u p e r _ u s e r ( ) ;
15 } e l s e {
16 c a l l _ n o r m a l _ u s e r ( ) ;
17 }
18 }
Code 2: Attack missed in CPI and piCFI but caught in BlankIt
For successful deployment of this technique, the predic-
tion accuracy must be very high, and for SPEC CPU 2006
benchmarks our technique achieves an average prediction ac-
curacy of over 94% (100% on 3 benchmarks, and over 97%
for 9 benchmarks). BlankIt on average reduces the number of
dynamically linked functions by over 97% and reduces ROP
gadgets in the code section by over 97%. BlankIt incurs a
small overhead of 18% on SPEC 2006 with all libraries.
1.1 Contributions
The following are the contributions of this work:
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1. A framework for dynamically loading and unloading
library functions on demand at binary level.
2. A prediction mechanism for predicting the required li-
brary functions to be loaded at each call-site, thus avoid
over-approximation (such as in CFI).
3. An audit and alarm technique that on misprediction runs
a full-blown memory safety check on the library function
to catch any attack.
4. An evaluation of our framework using specCPU2006
benchmarks and its supporting libraries–glibc, libm,
libgcc, and libstdc++–some of which are are not han-
dled in mechanisms that depend on library source.
Our contributions result in the following security implica-
tions:
1. The set of active dynamically linked functions is reduced
to protect against future, unforeseen exploits that mainly
rely on code reuse and replay-based attack construction,
and we provide reasonable metrics and results for the
same.
2. The glibc library, notorious for vulnerabilities and not
tackled by most of the state-of-the-art defense tech-
niques, is addressed.
3. Safety guarantees for known exploits that state-of-the-art
CFI techniques cannot provide (as seen in the function
pointer example in Code 1, or the example case study in
section 6).
4. Some of the control-flow bending attacks that depend on
non-control data are thwarted, which falls under the area
of attacks deemed as outside the scope of CFI and also
CPI.
2 BlankIt Overall Framework
BlankIt is an environment for demand driven loading of li-
brary functions at runtime. BlankIt first creates a dynamic
environment for demand-driven loading when the library is
initially imported. Then during runtime it loads library func-
tions on demand. When the library is imported, BlankIt does
the following for every function: inserts a probe at the func-
tion entry, copies the function code after the probe into a safe
read-only memory, and wipes (blanks) out all the code after
the inserted probe.
The application itself is also instrumented beforehand. A
predictor (a decision tree learnt through off-line profiling), is
instrumented at various points in the program’s control flow
graph prior to each library call site. Its output at runtime is
simply the chain of functions within the library that it expects
to occur at a given call site. Different artifacts are included in
the decision tree, such as the call site ID, reverse dominance
frontier (RDF), and the arguments to the library function.
When the application calls a library function, the probe (in-
serted when the library was imported) gets invoked. This
probe checks if the functions called are as predicted, and if
they are, execution continues inside loaded functions. If, how-
ever, the call is not through legitimate means (non-predicted
and not legal) then an attack is detected. Any attempts to
bypass the probe results in a fault or crash because the code
section has been blanked. Finally, when the control returns to
the application, the functions that were copied are reset back
to zero.This purging is what minimizes dynamically linked
functions.
The defense of BlankIt at a higher level is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. It shows that in the normal runtime A, an overflow
vulnerability can be exploited to jump to an arbitrary address
within glibc, but in runtime B with BlankIt, since the library
functions are wiped out, jumping to an arbitrary address re-
sults in a fault. The prediction mechanism reduces the set of
functions that can be reached through the vulnerability.
Figure 1: An application running with (B) and without (A)
BlankIt (showing a basic return-to-libc attack from [55]).
As mentioned, a highly accurate yet light-weight prediction
framework is very critical to the success of BlankIt. The pre-
diction framework first classifies call chains inside the linked
library as divergent or non-divergent. This is based on the un-
derlying call graphs. As much as 27% of the functions within
glibc are found to exhibit linear control flow (i.e. all functions
are must-reachable); these can be loaded without perform-
ing any dynamic prediction. The remaining functions (73%),
however, must be dynamically predicted. The prediction mod-
els are built in a context-sensitive, deliberate manner during
training runs. Not all context is considered. That is, generat-
ing a model that captures multiple features of a library call
site’s context (such as preceding program paths, call chains,
etc.) could provide high accuracy, but the elaborate model
could also pose very high overheads. Instead, we compute
the predicates on which the call site and call arguments are
control dependent and generate the model solely based on
that. More details on this are presented in the forthcoming
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sections.
We empirically show (based on the intuition of static value
separation via SSA) that a model based on reverse dominance
frontiers is accurate and lightweight. Such an approach pro-
vides a highly likely subset of the may-reachable set of func-
tions from a given call site and the subset itself is a function
of arguments of the callsite summarized by the static-dynamic
artifacts in the application. All of this together allows us to
predict the may-reachable set of functions based on the calling
context at each call site.
When a function that is not in the predicted set is invoked
at runtime, it means either there was a misprediction or an
attack. In the case of misprediction, the function was required
but left blank. It can also happen, however, that a function
is part of the predicted set but not actually needed. In this
latter case, the execution continues without any glitches, but
it exposes additional function surface. Overprediction, which
is very rare, as shown later in Section 5, is still better than
static approximation of reachable functions in CFI, as only
valid call chains are loaded. In the case of underprediction,
i.e. when functions are required but remain blanked, BlankIt
starts an audit and alarm phase to check for an attack. In this
phase the library function and its arguments are handed over
to a process that runs the library function with a full memory
safety mechanism under Valgrind [39], which then checks if
the misprediction is an attack.
2.1 Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume that the program is not self-
modifying, and an attacker can read/write the data section
and read/execute the code section of a vulnerable program.
We assume that the application source, LLVM compiler that
instruments prediction (decision trees) in the application, the
dynamic BlankIt runtime, and the underlying hardware are
not compromised. The arguments to the library calls can
be tampered before the call but after the earliest available
points in the application. Prediction calls to BlankIt from user
applications are protected against any argument tampering
using pass-by-register semantics; further, these arguments are
guaranteed to fall within a compile-time known prediction set.
Application code pages are W ⊕ X, and BlankIt maintains
this property between copying and blanking operations to
guard against code injection (and potentially probe insertion).
All external libraries can be a source of threat, and any such
external call must be protected. We make no assumptions on
obfuscated code or hand-written binaries or any other calling
conventions, unlike some CFI mechanisms.
Repeatedly calling BlankIt’s copy and blank functions does
not change the state of the application nor increase dynam-
ically linked functions. Attackers are unable to hijack the
loading of the functions. Potentially there are two possibili-
ties here: one is to influence decision trees and the second is to
take over the probes. Both are impossible. The decision trees
are embedded and compiled into application code (SPEC) and
use read-only arguments imported from the application; since
the attacker has no access nor the ability to tamper the appli-
cation code, she can not maliciously influence the decision
trees. BlankIt probes cannot be hijacked or triggered by an
attacker either: such an arbitrary probe would be caught the
same way any arbitrary jump is caught (due to illegal control
flow). Secondly, probes are inserted at the respective call sites
in the application and are compiled into the same. Thus, the
attacker has no ability to tamper the code at the probe.
3 BlankIt Runtime
For demand-driven loading, we have developed BlankIt, a
binary tool based on Intel’s Pin [43]. It wipes (blanks) out
all functions in a library and loads (copies) them only on
demand. The details of the design and optimization of BlankIt
are described here. The runtime is guided by the predictor
which is described in the next section.
3.1 BlankIt Design
BlankIt is a pintool and adheres to the programming model
set forth by Pin. There are two modes in which Pin operates:
JIT and Probe. JIT mode is flexible but slower; probe mode is
limited but faster. Probe mode supports instrumentation at the
start and end of functions, but not at instruction granularity. In
probe mode, all the instrumentation is inserted at the start-up,
and then execution is handed off to the application to run
natively; thus, the overhead incurred is the probe insertion
overhead at the beginning and the dynamic execution costs of
executing probes. Since the instrumentation is static, there are
no stalls during the execution, and an attacker cannot use this
to his/her advantage. Due to these reasons, BlankIt uses probe
mode. In terms of functionality, probe mode is sufficient for
BlankIt, and in terms of overhead, it is necessary.
On-demand loading is achieved in BlankIt through two
stages. The first is when a library is loaded initially for exe-
cution. The second is during execution of the application. At
initialization time, BlankIt iterates over all of the executable’s
shared objects. Then for each function within a shared object,
it overwrites the first few bytes with a trampoline and sets the
remaining bytes to zeros. In other words, once initialization
is complete, every shared object’s text section has been wiped
out and replaced with thunks. BlankIt maintains a separate
copy of functions in a trusted cache. At runtime, the appli-
cation normally calls into its library functions without any
changes. The original functions now contain trampolines at
their start, however, which bounce execution into a generic
handler, or in Pin-speak, a probe. At this point, BlankIt has the
responsibility of patching back the original code and trans-
ferring control accordingly. The BlankIt probe copies the
original function’s bytes back into place (i.e. from the end of
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the trampoline to the end of the function) and then returns to
the function. This mechanism is illustrated below.
Figure 2 depicts this mechanism for a two-function call
chain. When the application calls a library function (malloc
in this case), execution proceeds along arrow 1 to the origi-
nal function location in libc. During initialization, however,
BlankIt had replaced it with a trampoline. The trampoline
causes execution to flow along arrow 2 to the probe_copy
function. Focusing first on lines 6-9, a loop over a map m
copies and remembers all functions of the currently predicted
set of functions. Here we see that malloc and mmap64 are
needed, so they are copied back into place in libc. Arrows
4, 5, 6 and 7 are needed because in this example, malloc
depends on mmap64 for this particular invocation.
Figure 2: An example of how the copy probe works. Execu-
tion flows in order along the arrows.
There are two other important features of Figure 2. The
first is that the trampoline in mmap64 is still taken (the two
small dashed arrows at 5 and 6), even though its code is al-
ready in place and no additional copying was needed. This is
handled in lines 4-5 in probe_copy. The second is that there
is no blanking at the end, i.e. arrow 8 proceeds back to the
application. These two details are treated in the discussion on
optimization.
A second type of probe (Figure 3) is used for both blanking
and prediction. In a BlankIt-enabled application, prediction
calls are hoisted before the library calls. The predictions are
themselves library calls, though, and BlankIt simply replaces
them with a probe during initialization.
In Figure 3, the application calls a library function
(free), so at compile-time, a call to blankit_predict
was inserted with an ID of the profiled/learned call chain
at that call site. The initialization for BlankIt replaced
all blankit_predict calls with probe_blankit_predict,
which allows it to blank the last set of copied functions (lines
4-5) and update the ID of the new prediction set (line 6).
probe_blankit_predict then returns along arrow 2 to the
application, where it invokes the library function, free. At
this point, the behavior is similar to that described in Figure
2.
3.2 BlankIt Optimizations
A number of optimization opportunities are available in run-
time. We focus on just two of several that were implemented.
Some optimizations were ineffective, as well. For example,
prediction allows for the possibility of copying not only the
missing bytes of a function back into place but also overwrit-
ing the trampoline, as well. The upshot of this is that there
will be no trampoline overhead for subsequent calls in the
predicted chain (i.e. arrows 5 and 6 in Figure 2). The poten-
tial downside is that the trampolines must be copied back
when the blanking is done. There was no noticeable runtime
difference with this change.
3.2.1 Lazy Blanking
Figure 3 depicts the second type of probe that is responsible
for storing predictions and blanking the previous ones. As
discussed, blanking does not happen at the return of every
function call. Rather, it happens from within the next predic-
tion call that occurs just before the first/entry call to a library.
An alternative could be to blank at the return of every library
call, but this has much more call overhead. More importantly,
because blanking occurs when execution re-enters a library,
there is a chance that the predicted functions are the same as
the last predicted set. When this is the case, BlankIt does not
need to blank anything. This kind of “lazy blanking” trades
some security (by allowing the last call chain in the library
to remain unblanked and exposed until the next library call)
for speed; it still enforces security across call sites, though,
since no two call chains remain linked to the application at the
same time. Thus, this optimization does not have any adverse
effect on attack surface or ROP gadgets as far as the library is
concerned.
3.2.2 Full Call Chain Loading
BlankIt can be enabled to predict the entire sequence of calls
within a library call from the application. This sequence will
facilitate unblanking the next function and blanking the pre-
vious function in the call chain thus securing all functions
in the library except for the current executing function. This
will incapacitate any ROP or JOP attack within the call chain.
Note that pin allows for calling a probe after every routine call
during which the previous function is unblanked. However,
by not blanking the previous function we expose the code
within the loaded call chain. If an adversary would use any
gadget within the loaded call chain its only a matter till the
next jump to a function or blanked region is performed when
the attack is caught. Any ROP within the call chain can also
be caught by a shadow stack such as Intel’s CET [27]. As is
reported later in Section 5, the number of maximum gadgets
exposed at any library call advocates this optimization.
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Figure 3: A prediction call that passes an ID of 4 for the
upcoming predicted call chain. Within the prediction probe,
the last chain of exposed functions will be blanked if the
predicted set has changed. In this case, it has changed (from
malloc and mmap64 to free), so blanking occurs.
3.3 Audit and Alarm: Handling Mispredic-
tion
The drawback of any machine learning mechanism is that the
deployment is not always 100% accurate. Such a reduction in
accuracy results in false positives in BlankIt. However, when a
mispredict occurs, BlankIt enters an audit and alarm phase, in
which the library function arguments and the function name
are passed on to an auditor process. The auditor loads the
library through a dlopen call and calls the library function
while executing with Valgrind [39], a complete memory safety
mechanism. Further, BlankIt can choose to wait for its auditor
to report an attack, or continue execution and let the auditor
restore changes by the application, or kill the process. The
choice depends on the process and the execution environment.
For example, a virtual machine environment can easily restore
the changes made by an application [62].
BlankIt also handles a few cases of non-control data attacks
within the application other than the kind shown in Code 2.
Please refer to the appendix section 9.2 for more details.
   dlopen(lib);
   call lib_foo(a);
   is_attack_or_miss();
App with BlankIt  Shared space   Audit Process
 
miss
a = 10;
lib_foo(a);
strcpy(b,input);
temp 
copy
BlankIt
Valgrind
Figure 4: Audit phase either on misprediction or on an attack.
BlankIt handles a few cases of non-control data attacks within
application.
4 Call Graph Prediction
The BlankIt runtime is in some sense driven by the predic-
tion part. The prediction is concerned with determining the
expected, valid flow through the program. Distinguishing be-
tween (input-specific) legitimate dynamic control flow and
an illegitimate counterpart is critical to thwarting attempts
to construct a malicious security apparatus. A key goal of
this work is to build such an oracle that takes into account
input relatedness and predicts the functions that correspond
to the legitimate control flow. As described earlier, the pre-
dictor guides the BlankIt runtime to dynamically load only
the predicted functions while other functions are kept blank.
We now describe how we construct such an oracle based on
decision trees.
4.1 Overall Framework
1. First the static divergence analysis finds statically non-
divergent functions for which no prediction is needed.
2. We then instrument the reverse dominance frontiers
(RDFs) corresponding to every argument at every call
site to construct a call context for the library call.
3. The instrumented application is then profiled, and the
call context and argument values are logged along with
the call chain.
4. This profile information is fed into a machine learning
model that constructs a decision tree to predict the call
chain depending on the call context.
5. The generated decision tree is then instrumented into the
application at the application call site for prediction.
6. Finally, constant folding and dead code elimination is
carried out to remove redundant predicates.
7. The instrumented application then feeds the predicted
call chain into the BlankIt runtime system.
4.2 Static Call Flow Divergence Detection
In the first step of the prediction framework, we find library
functions that don’t have statically divergent call flow. In other
words, we identify functions in which the call sites do not
reside in a different control flow path. If a library function is
non-divergent, then all the dynamic calls of the function will
result in the same call chain. We find non-divergent functions
by checking if every call site within a function post dominates
the entry block of the function as shown in Algorithm 1. If the
callee is not on a control divergent path but is itself divergent,
then the caller is also marked as a divergent function, and
all other functions that call this function are also marked as
divergent functions.
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Algorithm 1 Static Divergence Detection
1: procedure NON-DIVERGENT(Function F)
2: BBentry← entry basic block in F
3: for each Call site Ci:
4: fci← function called in Ci
5: if non-divergent( fci) && Ci postdominates BBentry
then
6: F is non-divergent
7: End for
In glibc, we found that among all the functions analyzed,
roughly 27% of the functions are statically non-divergent.
Such functions exhibit a constant single call-graph that can
be statically determined for which no dynamic prediction
is required; however, dynamic prediction is a must for the
remaining 73% of call sites.
Library #Divergent #Non-divergent
glibc-2.26 1985 737
Table 1: Static divergence in glibc
4.3 Reverse Dominance Frontier-Based Pre-
diction
After generating a database of statically non-divergent func-
tions, we now look at predicting the call graph for the diverg-
ing ones. Normally, whole program path profiling would need
instrumentation of every branch. This would result in a path
prefix of a fixed window W , entailing the context of the last
W branches. This path prefix can then be used for prediction
of the call chain within the function call. We leverage the fact
that library functions are usually control divergent due to their
arguments and contend that the static context required to pre-
dict the call chain is the control dependence of the arguments
passed to the library.
This leads us to investigate the reverse dominance frontier
(RDF) of the arguments of a call site, because the divergence
in the library call path can be caused by the different defi-
nitions of arguments (determined by their respective RDF)
reaching the call site. For example, in Figure 5, a library call
to libCall() has one argument X0, which is defined as the phi
instruction of arguments X1 and X2. If the basic block B2 is
executed, X0 has a negative value, but if the basic block B3 is
executed, X0 has a positive value. In this case, both B2 and
B3 are control dependent on B1. Thus the branch condition
at B1 actually decides whether a positive or negative value is
passed to libCall(). If the execution path and the call chain
within the libCall() function differs for positive and negative
arguments, then we can learn to predict the call chain right af-
ter B1. The intuition here is that the call chain inside a library
call will be dependent on arguments sent to the library, which
in turn could be statically separated into corresponding SSA
variables of a backward slice and finally guarding control
dependent branches.
With RDF based prediction, the context leading up to a
call site consists of only the last executed RDF for every
function argument. This minimal instrumentation has enough
information to predict the call chain within a function with
reasonable accuracy. The only extra instrumentation required
is for correlating every branch with its corresponding function
argument, and for each function argument to be instrumented
with its RDF. When the profiling is done, the context for each
call site is constructed separately, depending on the RDFs of
its arguments. The instrumentation methodology is outlined
in Algorithm 2.
Figure 5: Simple control dependence example
4.4 Argument Value-Based Prediction
The control path in library functions can diverge because of
the various values of the arguments that are reaching the call
sites in the application from the same RDF. Since the RDF re-
mains constant, RDF based prediction might not be sufficient.
For example, we have observed that math library functions
like sqrt(x) and exp(x) have different call chains depend-
ing on the range of the parameters. In order to handle such
cases, we must classify the values of the function arguments
that reach from a single RDF, so we capture the values of
the arguments by profiling and appending the training model
with the value. Once we have the data on which we want to
learn and predict the behavior of the library call graph at each
call site, we feed the data to a machine learning model. This
value-based profiling also captures the values of the function
pointers. Thus if a function pointer is passed as an argument
to another function, then we are able to predict the function
invocation based on the function pointer values.
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Algorithm 2 RDF-based Instrumentation
1: procedure INSTRUMENT_FUNCTION(Func)
2: BBs_to_instrument← Null
3: for all callsitei ∈ Func do
4: Fci← function called in Ci
5: for all argument Ai ∈ Fci do
6: de f_worklist← get definition of Ai
7: for all instruction de fi ∈ worklist do
8: phi_instr_set← TRACE_PARENT_PHI(de fi)
9: . call returns a set of phi instructions
10: for all φi ∈ phi_instr_set do
11: for all incoming_BBi ∈ φi do
12: rd f_set← GET_RDF(incoming_BBi)
13: for all rd f_BBi ∈ rd f_set do
14: for all Successor Succi ∈ rd f_BB do
15: BBs_to_instrument← Succi
16: return BBs_to_instrument
17: procedure TRACE_PARENT_PHI(instruction)
18: phi_instr_set← Null
19: for all Operands opi ∈ instruction do
20: if opi is_a phi instruction then
21: phi_instr_set← opi
22: else
23: phi_instr_set← TRACE_PARENT_PHI(opi)
24: return phi_instr_set
4.5 Implementation
We used LLVM to insert instrumentation calls for recording
the call context for every library call made within the applica-
tion. The instrumented application was run using Pin JIT to
generate the profile trace. The trace is then parsed to create a
csv file with the training data. We use the Python scikit [45]
library to implement the machine learning model. The deci-
sion tree API
sklearn.tree.DecisionTreeClassifier is used to learn
the model and save it for later use. The python script reads
in the tables produced from the profiling phase. The learned
decision tree model is then written to file as a special text
format. That final text file is read by an LLVM pass, which
embeds the decision tree within the application (i.e. inserts
prediction calls for the runtime system). We found experi-
mentally that a max tree depth of 10 provided good accuracy
with acceptable peformance. Higher depth is only required if
there are too many rows with the same features but different
outcomes, but adds the dilemma of overfitting the training
data. We did not use boosting. Please refer to the appendix
section 9.3 for additional details on decision tree learning.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate BlankIt using SPEC CPU 2006. SPEC has several
properties that make it a good candidate for exercising and
evaluating BlankIt. First, it is performance-oriented, so we
can measure runtime overheads on realistic CPU-intensive
benchmarks. Second, it has a standard library profile, which
carries a relatively large CVE list. Lastly, call graphs of SPEC
benchmarks and their supporting libraries are significantly
dense and divergent, which are needed to stress the prediction
framework. As an example, SPEC benchmarks invoke 63
glibc unique functions at runtime on an average; this leads to
a 171-node, 378-edge static callgraph with a max callchain
depth of 7 (and in this case a function set of which only
5% are non-divergent) (see Table 2). A previous study [24]
demonstrates input similarity based on basic block and branch
execution frequencies, but the feature vector used for decision
tree includes RDF and value separation (with the intuition
that the call chain inside the library is a function of the values
of its arguments). While the RDF can have a relationship
with the similarity measure based on the branch frequency
in [24], the values do not. Also, we predict the paths within
the libraries, which are not analyzed by this work. Moreover,
real-world applications have inputs that stress the program
paths that can be used for training.
SPEC benchmark and glibc graph metrics Avg
1. # dynamically called glibc funcs from SPEC 63
2. # statically reachable funcs in glibc based on (1) 171
3. # callgraph edges based on static callgraph in (2) 378
4. # non-divergent functions in (2) 8
5. max static callchain depth of (2) 7
Table 2: Key graph metrics for SPEC CPU 2006 and glibc
With the exception of the linker shared object and the vdso
image, we have instrumented all the benchmarks’ shared ob-
jects. Table 3 shows the distribution of shared objects across
the benchmarks. The most important is glibc-2.26 [23], a fun-
damental library for programs written in C and compiled on
GNU/Linux systems. The library provides POSIX, BSD, OS-
specific and other APIs. Some of the basic facilities include
print, login, and crypt. Thus, glibc supports a wide range of
applications, which is borne out in the table (100% depen-
dence across all benchmarks). Historically, it has also been tar-
geted and exploited heavily. The other libraries are libm 2.26,
libgcc_s from the libgcc1 package v1:7.2.0-1ubuntu1 16.04,
and libstdc++ 6.0.24 which are also tackled by BlankIt. Our
runtime uses Pin v3.6. We have built SPEC with version 5
of LLVM, which fails to compile 400.perlbench. It generates
multiple definitions for gnu_dev_major, minor, and other
functions, so we have elided treatment of it here. All other
C/C++ benchmarks are presented. The raw decision trees have
a lot of compile time constant checks which after constant
folding reduces the tree to few if else checks thus increasing
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binary size only modestly. All runtime overhead experiments
are on an Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS machine with an AMD Ryzen
7 1800X 8-Core 3.6 GHz processor and 32 GB DD4 2666
MHz RAM. All the SPEC benchmarks were trained on “test”
(small) and “train” (medium) input data sets and were regres-
sion tested using the (large) “ref” input data sets. All runtime
experiments are averaged over three runs.
Benchmark libc libm libgcc libstdc++
401.bzip2 X
403.gcc X
429.mcf X
433.milc X X
444.namd X X X X
445.gobmk X X
450.soplex X X X X
453.povray X X X X
456.hmmer X X
458.sjeng X
462.libquantum X X X
464.h264ref X X
470.lbm X X
471.omnetpp X X X X
473.astar X X X X
482.sphinx3 X X
483.xalancbmk X X X X
Table 3: Shared objects in SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks
5.1 Security
What constitutes an attack surface, especially when preparing
for unknown future attacks, is difficult to capture. We present
three results for reducing dynamic linked functions. Taken
together, they offer three different axes for understanding
how BlankIt is behaving. They summarize (1) the number
of functions that are exposed, (2) the number of gadgets in a
known type of attack that are exposed, and (3) the number of
known functions from a vulnerable list that are exposed.
The first measure is a dynamic metric that describes the
maximum number of library functions exposed at any given
time during execution. This can be described by the following
formula:
exposed = p+ s+ c (1)
where exposed is the maximum number of loaded functions
at runtime, p is the number of functions that Pin is unable to
instrument and thus must be left as they are (without blanking
them), s is the number of functions that are less than 14 bytes
and therefore too small for blanking, and c is the maximum-
length call chain for a given benchmark that our framework
dynamically loads at any callsite during the execution. In
other words, the number of exposed functions in the worst
case is the maximum number of unblanked functions that
could be leveraged in some attack. The percent reduction of
code surface is then given by:
reduction=
∑l nl− exposed
∑l nl
∗100 (2)
where l is some library and nl is the total number of functions
available at runtime in some library l. This metric does not
capture anything about the inherent weaknesses or strengths
of the exposed functions - it only captures that they are ex-
posed. Table 4 presents this result in the first column as “%
reduction in dynamic linked functions”. This worst-case re-
duction is, on average, 97.1%.
Benchmark % Exposed
Code
Surface
Reduction
% ROP
Gadget
Reduction
% glibc CVE
Function
Reduction
401.bzip2 97.7 98.9 95.7
403.gcc 97.2 97.8 95.7
429.mcf 94.5 95.9 95.7
433.milc 98 98.5 95.7
444.namd 97 96.4 93.6
445.gobmk 95.7 96.2 93.6
450.soplex 97.4 99.3 97.9
453.povray 96.9 97.7 93.6
456.hmmer 97.9 97.9 93.6
458.sjeng 97.8 98.9 95.7
462.libquantum 97.9 98.6 95.7
464.h264ref 97.9 98.7 95.7
470.lbm 97.8 98.6 95.7
471.omnetpp 95.6 96.9 95.7
473.astar 96.6 96.6 95.7
482.sphinx3 97.6 98.2 95.7
483.xalancbmk 96.9 98.1 91.5
Table 4: Reductions metrics (DLF = Dynamic Linked Func-
tion)
The results show a very high percentage reduction; signifi-
cantly more than any static or dynamic technique can achieve.
Return-oriented programming depends on ROP gadgets in
the code in order to carry out an effective attack. To measure
the reduction in gadgets, we leveraged ROPgadget [47], an
analysis tool for enumerating the ROP gadgets in a binary.
Because BlankIt is a dynamic technique, the number of gad-
gets varies over time. Thus, similar to before, we choose the
worst-case scenario at any given point in the program and
report its ROP gadget reduction. As before, we calculate the
maximum number of exposed gadgets (similar to equation 1),
and then calculate the reduction by summing over the number
of gadgets in the text section in each library, subtracting out
the exposed gadgets, and gathering the percentage (as in equa-
tion 2). Table 4 shows the benefits of BlankIt on ROP gadget
reduction. The average is 97.8%. Please refer to the appendix
section 9.1 for details on the quality of these gadgets.
10
The last metric is a measure of the functions in glibc CVEs
that are removed by BlankIt. We reviewed the list of all 95
CVEs for glibc, which reach back to year 2000, and we iden-
tified all unique functions mentioned in the descriptions. Of
these, we identified 47 that are unequivocally loaded by glibc
in the SPEC suite. That is, there must be an exact match in
the dynamically loaded list of glibc functions for a function
related in a glibc CVE to be considered. For example, “alloca”
is mentioned in CVE-2015-1473, but it is not explicitly ex-
ported with that name and so is discarded, even though there
are multiple allocation functions. Then the number of exposed
CVE functions is obtained as follows:
exposedcve= p+ s+a (3)
where p and s are uninstrumented due to Pin or too small
to instrument (as before), but a represents any function that
is called that is in the CVE function list. The percentage is
then taken out of the 47 CVE functions. This metric should
not be misunderstood as the number of CVEs since 2000
that are thwarted by BlankIt. Rather, it classifies functions
as vulnerable based on their CVE history, and then asks how
many such functions are exposed under BlankIt running a
common benchmark. The results are shown in the last column
of Table 4. The average reduction is 95.1%.
5.2 Runtime
Figure 6 shows the runtime overhead. There are three bars per
benchmark: native, BlankIt for glibc, and BlankIt for all libs.
The most crucial library for security purposes is glibc (the
middle bars for each benchmark in the graph). The average
slowdown for a BlankIt-enabled application on only glibc is
16%. There is a slight speedup in the case of lbm, which can
be accounted for by variance. The rest perform reasonably
well, with gcc being the worst at 1.76x. The slowdown for
gcc (and similarly, for sjeng) is due to heavy usage of libc.
Runtime overhead is primarily due to library call frequency
and not due to misprediction. Thus, while prediction accuracy
was poorest for libquantum (discussed in the next section),
the performance was good. In this BlankIt prototype the audit
thread runs in parallel and “keeps up” with the mispredict
frequency and does not add extra blocking. There are still
open optimization opportunities to improve the performance,
which may include compiler-based hoisting operations to pull
prediction probes outside of loops.
The rightmost bars represent a BlankIt-enabled applica-
tion on all libraries. In some cases, (bzip2, gcc, mcf, sjeng)
the results are almost identical to a glibc-only result because
they link against no other libraries. In other cases, adding the
libraries costs little in overhead for the extra security. The
average slowdown for BlankIt over all libs is 18%, demonstrat-
ing that BlankIt likely scales well across programs’ dynamic
library sets.
5.3 Prediction
Our treatment of prediction includes our observations while
working with the framework, accuracy results and analysis on
SPEC, and then a breakdown of the kinds of mispredictions
that were measured.
5.3.1 Observations
In the case of library functions, especially in languages like C
that do not have a context for library function calls, we have
observed that the set of functions called within the library
can be predicted based on the dynamic calling context. The
necessary dynamic calling context is discovered by the deci-
sion tree which can as simple as just the name of the function
and/or the call site.
However, some times the call chain is dependent on the
arguments passed to the function, which could include a func-
tion pointer. For example, there might be a math library func-
tion that calls a different set of internal functions based on
the arguments. The decision tree is able to handle such cases
by training on the values passed to the function. It is able
to model the different call chains that are invoked based on
the range of values of the function parameters encountered
during profiling. This value-based approach handles function
pointers as any other value. That is, if a function takes a func-
tion pointer as an argument, then based on the value of the
pointer, different call chains will be invoked. If the profiling
data has all possible values that a function pointer can take,
then our decision tree is able to train on them to predict the
right call chain, depending on the function pointer value.
The decision tree is currently unable to capture other use
cases like the presence of multiple threads or certain special
system states or error conditions which were not triggered
during profiling.
5.3.2 Accuracy and Audit overhead
Table 5 shows the prediction accuracy and audit overhead for
the SPEC2006 benchmark suite. Over half of the accuracies
are 97% or greater; three are 100%; and the average is 94.3%.
As a matter of fact, the decision tree’s prediction ability was
tested for predicting every function in SPEC2006 at every call
site and was found to be very close to the one reported here
for the libraries.
One of the important reasons for very high prediction accu-
racy stems from the fact that libraries follow software design
patterns; the use cases of libraries are therefore finite and can
be siloed. Our decision trees are able to learn these patterns
which are input-related and during regression testing are able
to pinpoint the silo and its underlying set of function calls.
The only application for which the decision tree accuracy was
relatively low is libquantum. For this application, there was a
call chain involving cfree and cfree followed by munmap in
train and ref inputs, respectively, which is one of the major
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Figure 6: Runtime slowdown for BlankIt on SPEC 2006 CPU, normalized against native.
Benchmark % Accuracy Audit (µs)
401.bzip2 91 287
403.gcc 99 12
429.mcf 94 92
433.milc 100 27
444.namd 99 11
445.gobmk 84 8
450.soplex 92 26
453.povray 97 6
456.hmmer 98 6
458.sjeng 97 27
462.libquantum 60 41
464.h264ref 100 28
470.lbm 98 171
471.omnetpp 99 6
473.astar 100 58
482.sphinx3 99 11
483.xalancbmk 96.9 18
Table 5: Call Chain Prediction Accuracy and Audit Overhead
sources of misprediction. The reasons for these differences
are due to the size of memory that is being freed which is not
captured by the input oriented mechanism based on RDF and
argument value separation.
The audit overhead is reported as the geomean of mis-
predicted function runtime within valgrind. The results add
confidence that running an audit in parallel is tenable. The
total library function call counts are not reported, but as a
typical example, lbm has 2,626,463 runtime library calls (and
98% prediction accuracy). lbm takes roughly 250s to execute
under BlankIt. Thus, a 171µs overhead per mispredict falls
well within the 2˜10 mispredictions that occur per second. This
shows that doing full program stops until Valgrind reports
back is plausible.
5.3.3 Misprediction Breakdown
We further classify the mispredictions into overpredictions
(where more functions were loaded than necessary) and under-
prediction (where lesser number of functions loaded than nec-
essary). In almost all the cases, there were under-predictions
(100%) except in case of gcc (where the under and over pre-
dictions were almost equal) and soplex (where there were
under-predictions 93%). The main reason is that when the
decision tree encounters a call-site which was not exercised
during training, it is extremely conservative and bases the
prediction on whether the entry function was seen during
training; due to these reasons it chooses a subset of functions
that were callees of the entry functions. This in turn provides
good security since no spurious functions are brought in that
could increase the exposed code surface.
5.4 Multithreading and Windows
BlankIt is not limited to single-threaded programs, neither in
its general approach nor current implementation, nor is it OS-
specific. BlankIt can leverage Intel Pin’s threading support
and add a synchronized blanking/un-blanking mechanism for
parallel programs. The thread that blanks (or fills) a piece of
code would have to acquire a lock for that particular code sec-
tion to do so (page granularity in Linux). Similarly, BlankIt
can also be ported to Windows without any design or con-
ceptual changes: mprotect can be replaced by VirtualProtect,
msvcrt.dll protected in place of glibc, etc.
6 Case Study
We study how a recent vulnerability in glibc, CVE-2018-
11236 [14] on buffer overflow is handled by BlankIt. CVE-
2018-11236 is a vulnerability that exists in glibc version 2.27
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and earlier in the realpath function in stdlib/canonicalize.c.
The function realpath intakes a pathname as one of its argu-
ments. If a pathname that has length close to SSIZE_MAX is
passed as an argument, it causes a buffer overflow that over-
writes the stack on line 191 in Code3. This overflow can be
exploited to jump to any ROP/JOP gadget and carry out a
Turing-complete attack. With BlankIt, however, jumping to
any arbitrary location is not possible, as the code sections
are blanked. CFI mechanisms would limit arbitrary jumps, as
well. However, in CFI the attacker can jump to a legit func-
tion with exploitive inputs and carry out the attack. BlankIt
catches the attack if the call to this function is not predicted in
the path. Further, if the function realpath is never used, then
BlankIt never loads it, catching any attempt to attack through
the function.
183 e x t r a _ b u f = _ _ a l l o c a ( path_max ) ;
184 l e n = s t r l e n ( end ) ;
185 i f ( path_max − n <= l e n )
186 {
187 _ _ s e t _ e r r n o (ENAMETOOLONG) ;
188 goto e r r o r ;
189 }
190 /∗ Car e f u l here , end may be a p o i n t e r
i n t o e x t r a _ b u f . . . ∗ /
191 memmove (& e x t r a _ b u f [ n ] , end , l e n + 1) ;
Code 3: CVE-2018-11236
7 Related Work
The two main lines of research that are closely related to
security-focused debloating are software debloating and secu-
rity vulnerability techniques.
The embedded software community performed debloat-
ing based on link-time optimizations in order to reduce code
size. As mentioned earlier, compiler based link-time optimiza-
tions involve statically determining a set of functions to be
removed from the linked library. The key goal of such link
time optimizations is to compact the code size [4, 16]. While
such solutions [21, 37] have shown to substantially reduce
the code size, they are not geared towards solving the se-
curity issues due to bloated libraries. This is because static
link time optimizations err on the conservative side. A load
time mechanism such as piece-wise compilation [46] reduces
approximation but relies on a CFI mechanism for defense
against the ROP gadget exploitation in the loaded functions.
A new direction of code debloating based on programmer
specifications was developed in [25]. These problems are
different from the goal of BlankIt, which reduces the num-
ber of dynamic functions linked so that the possibilities of
constructing malicious programs diminishes significantly.
Debloating is an active research topic within the software
engineering community and oftentimes with respect to perfor-
mance. Mitchell et al. [34] investigated causes of bloat and
how “health signatures” can describe memory footprints in
a way that lends itself to value judgments about the strength
of a software design. In a similar work, a tool called Yeti was
developed to help identify costly data structures [32]. Regard-
ing performance, Xu et al. [60] argue that memory bloat is a
more severe problem given reduced scaling of chip real estate
due to Moore’s law. Other research is on understanding ex-
cessive abstractions or object creation in Java and how these
affect performance [33]; on identifying heavy computations
that have little benefit (e.g. constructing a large object only
to check its size) [59]; on debloating container objects due
to their negative impact on performance [57]; and on reusing
data structures rather than recreating them to boost perfor-
mance [58]. While this work has paved some of the way for
debloating, it is not geared towards security and thus can not
be directly applied to the problem of reducing exposed code
surface.
The lack of memory safety in languages such as C/C++
has been a pernicious and long-lasting problem, and a vast
number of potential solutions have been proposed. Real world
exploits show that all currently deployed protections can be de-
feated, and in fact new vulnerabilities are reported frequently
[13,17,50]. Memory safety mechanisms can safeguard against
many of the memory corruption attacks, however, is ≥ 2X
slower in case of source based memory safety techniques
like CETS [38] and ≥ 10X slower in case of binary based
ones like Dr.Memory [8]. There has been work on control
pointer integrity (CPI) checking [5, 28], Address Space Lay-
out Randomization [49], as well as control flow integrity
(CFI) checking [1, 10, 22, 30, 63]. In spite of such advance-
ments, in [18] authors show an attack called Control Jujutsu
that exploits the imprecision of scalable pointer analysis to
bypass fine-grained enforcement of CFI. Control-Flow Bend-
ing [10] (CFB) showed that even a fully-precise static CFI
cannot defend against many non-control data attacks. In addi-
tion to these attacks, there are many DoS (denial of service)
and privilege escalation attacks documented in [13] that are
unrelated to the issue of control flow and could have severe
implications for the security of the linked application.As dis-
cussed earlier in the introduction, BlankIT prevents some
attacks that escape detection techniques based on CFI and
CPI.
8 Conclusion
In this work, we propose and show how to effectively imple-
ment a scheme of demand-driven loading to reduce the ex-
posed code surface of vulnerable linked libraries. We achieve
this by capturing control dependence of library call sites (via
reverse dominance frontiers) and by training decision trees to
establish input-relatedness. We also devise a highly effective,
very low overhead, binary-level mechanism. It dynamically
loads the needed functions at a given call site and blanks
out the unneeded ones, which significantly weakens an at-
tacker’s ability to construct gadgets. Our results on the full
SPEC2006 benchmark suite (evaluated with its 4 major user-
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level libraries, libc, libm, libgcc and libstdc++) are very strong:
the prediction accuracy in most cases being at least 97%, and
dynamic linked functions and ROP gadget reduction likewise
being at least 97%. On average, the runtime overhead with
BlankIt is 18%, across full set of SPEC benchmarks which
is within tolerable limits. BlankIt also catches few cases of
non-control data attacks and some which are not tackled by
CFI and CPI in general. BlankIt has all these benefits without
recompiling any linked binaries.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Quality of Gadgets
Benchmark Gadget quality BlankIt Gadget quality
401.bzip2 0.81 1.25
403.gcc 0.81 1.07
429.mcf 0.81 1.14
433.milc 0.75 1.29
444.namd 0.77 0.97
445.gobmk 0.75 0.84
450.soplex 0.77 0.96
453.povray 0.77 1.12
456.hmmer 0.75 1.19
458.sjeng 0.81 1.15
462.libquantum 0.73 0.79
464.h264ref 0.75 1.15
470.lbm 0.75 1.35
471.omnetpp 0.77 1.08
473.astar 0.77 1.15
482.sphinx3 0.75 0.97
483.xalancbmk 0.77 0.98
Table 6: ROP Gadget Quality in SPEC CPU 2006 with and
without BlankIt (higher indicates better security)
We would like to present details on the quality of gadgets
with respect to BlankIt. Gality [20] is a tool that measures
the quality of the gadgets for the ease of constructing an
attack and provides an overall score. In details, the tool first
categorizes the gadgets, finding the distribution of different
gadgets available in the arsenal of the attacker. The tool also
checks the side effects of a gadget. A side-effect is measured
by the number of preconditions that must be satisfied for using
a gadget. In other words, a high quality gadget is one with
no pre-conditions or that does not affect any other register
or memory by overwriting the value and thus giving away
the attack. The Gality score starts at 0 and is increased for
side-effects and pre-conditions. Thus higher score indicates
worse gadget quality hence better security. As shown in Table
6 BlankIt consistently has higher scores thus signifying that
BlankIt offers better security.
9.2 Non-Control Data Attack Defense
We demonstrate non-control data attack that is mitigated by
BlankIt. In Figure 4, the arguments of the library function
are copied at the latest available point, which is at either the
PHI function or the definition (whichever is the reaching defi-
nition). The copies are passed to the auditor process during
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misprediction. Any input-based overflow within the library is
caught by Valgrind. However, if the input to the library is mod-
ified within the application and results in a valid program flow,
then Valgrind does not report an error. Thus, in cases where
the input to the library is modified after the latest availability
point of an argument, BlankIt can catch the attack by com-
paring the predicted call chain with the call graph reported
by the auditor process. In the example, input ’a’ is modified
through buffer overflow in ’strcpy(b,input)’ and results in a
misprediction. However, the predicted chain matches with the
call graph reported by the auditor, thus catching the attack
and raising an alarm. During actual misprediction, the Val-
grind call chain matches the observed call chain and not the
predicted call chain and thus, declares it as legal execution.
9.3 Decision Tree Learning
The decision tree is a machine learning model based on induc-
tive inference and which satisfies BlankIt’s requirement for
quick runtime lookup. It is trained on a set of input attributes
and the observed output by correlating the observed output
with a disjunction of conjunctions of predicates on the input
attributes [35]. The decision tree tests a predicate on one of
the input attributes at every node. Depending on the outcome
of the predicate, one of the outgoing edges is followed to the
next node and halts when a leaf node is reached. A leaf node
represents a class label, which is the prediction for the given
input. In our model, the input is the context leading up to a
call site, and the output is the call graph of the callee function.
The context at a call site is the call site itself, the function that
is called, and the function argument values. Given the context
at a call site for a callee function F , the model will predict the
set of functions within the library called through F .
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